Tennessee’s PBM Law Signals a Broader Challenge to Healthcare Vertical Integration

For years, vertical integration was treated as the natural direction of the U.S. healthcare market.

Insurers acquired pharmacy benefit managers. PBMs acquired or affiliated with specialty, mail-order, and retail pharmacies. Health systems expanded into physician practices, outpatient facilities, pharmacies, technology platforms, and other services.

The business case was familiar: common ownership could reduce fragmentation, improve coordination, create efficiencies, and lower costs. That argument is now receiving much greater scrutiny.

Tennessee’s recently enacted Freedom, Access, and Integrity in Registered Pharmacy Act, commonly called the FAIR Rx Act, is one of the clearest examples. Rather than limiting itself to PBM transparency, reimbursement practices, or patient-steering rules, Tennessee is challenging whether pharmacy benefit managers and health insurers should be permitted to own or control pharmacies at all.

The larger message for healthcare companies is not that vertical integration is that integrated ownership structures can no longer be seen as inherently efficient or politically secure.

When a business model depends on directing prescriptions, referrals, reimbursement, data, or revenue toward affiliated entities, ownership itself can become a regulatory risk.

What Tennessee Changed

Governor Bill Lee signed the FAIR Rx Act on May 22, 2026. The law restricts certain common ownership and control relationships involving pharmacies, PBMs, and health insurance issuers. Subject to limited exceptions and transition provisions, affected organizations must separate prohibited ownership interests by July 1, 2028.

The law reaches pharmacies licensed in Tennessee as well as nonresident pharmacies dispensing or shipping prescriptions to Tennessee residents. This can include mail-order, specialty, central-fill, telepharmacy, and automated dispensing operations.

It also requires disclosures involving direct and indirect ownership, affiliates, contractors, and other arrangements that may provide a PBM with influence over pharmacy operations.

That makes Tennessee’s approach different from many traditional PBM laws.

Most PBM legislation regulates conduct. It may prohibit patient steering, require rebate disclosure, establish reimbursement standards, or impose reporting and fiduciary obligations.

Tennessee is taking a different approach. The law reflects a judgment that certain conflicts may be too embedded in the ownership model to be corrected through disclosure or contract regulation alone.

CVS Health and Cigna’s Express Scripts have challenged the law in federal court. They argue that the restrictions could interfere with pharmacy access and improperly target integrated companies. Tennessee lawmakers have defended the measure as a response to concerns about competition, drug costs, and the ability of PBMs to direct prescriptions toward affiliated pharmacies.

The litigation will determine how far Tennessee can go. The strategic significance of the law, however, is already clear.

State policymakers are becoming more willing to examine whether the structure of a healthcare company creates incentives that cannot be adequately controlled through ordinary compliance requirements.

Why Vertical Integration Is Under Pressure

Tennessee’s law did not just happen overnight. 

The three largest PBMs manage most prescription drug claims in the United States. Each operates within a larger healthcare organization that owns or affiliates with other parts of the healthcare financing, pharmacy, provider, or distribution system.

That concentration has caused regulators and lawmakers to focus less on size by itself and more on how integrated companies use contracting authority, reimbursement decisions, network design, patient data, and ownership relationships.

Federal Trade Commission staff have reported that large PBMs sometimes reimbursed affiliated pharmacies more than unaffiliated pharmacies for certain specialty generic drugs. The FTC also raised concerns that PBM-affiliated pharmacies may benefit from prescription steering and other advantages unavailable to independent competitors.

Congress has pursued PBM transparency and compensation reforms involving rebates, reporting, and the relationship between PBM compensation and drug prices. Federal proposals have also considered restrictions on common ownership involving PBMs, insurers, and pharmacies.

States too are developing their own approaches to this problem. Arkansas enacted a law directed at PBM ownership of pharmacies, while California has pursued restrictions involving steering, formulary practices, and affiliated pharmacies. Several of these measures are now being litigated.

These developments do not establish that all vertical integration is unlawful or undesirable. They simply show that the burden of persuasion is changing.

With times changing they way they are, an integrated company may no longer be able to defend its structure simply by citing efficiency. Policymakers, regulators, customers, and courts are examining whether the company directs business toward its own affiliates, treats affiliated and independent organizations differently, restricts customer choice, or retains value in ways that are difficult for plan sponsors and patients to evaluate.

It's less about whether entities share common ownership and more about how that ownership affects commercial behavior.

How Independent Companies Can Use the Shift

Regulatory pressure on vertical integration creates opportunities for independent healthcare companies.

Independent pharmacies, specialty pharmacies, physician groups, technology vendors, and healthcare service organizations can position their lack of ownership conflicts as a commercial advantage.

Their strongest message is that an independent organization can offer clearer economics, broader choice, greater flexibility, and fewer incentives to favor an affiliated channel.

An independent pharmacy may be able to show that its dispensing and clinical decisions are not influenced by a parent PBM. A technology company may emphasize that its platform supports multiple payers, pharmacies, and providers without favoring a related business. A physician group may use its independence to negotiate across several networks instead of relying on one vertically integrated partner.

As customers become more sensitive to steering and self-preferencing, independence can become part of the company’s value proposition.

That advantage should be supported by contracts, operating practices, and evidence. 

What Buyers and Investors Should Reevaluate

Healthcare buyers and investors should reconsider how they evaluate vertically integrated growth strategies.

A transaction involving a pharmacy, provider group, health platform, or distribution business may appear attractive because of projected referrals, cross-selling opportunities, preferred network access, or administrative synergies.

Those assumptions may be vulnerable if the expected value depends on steering, reimbursement advantages, exclusive contracting, or preferential treatment among affiliates.

Due diligence should examine whether the target’s revenue depends heavily on an affiliated payer, PBM, provider, pharmacy, distributor, or management company. Buyers should also determine whether key contracts would remain economically viable if anti-steering rules, ownership restrictions, equal-treatment requirements, or stronger disclosure obligations were imposed.

Ownership and management agreements should accurately reflect who exercises operational control. Affiliate arrangements should be evaluated for fair-market terms, conflict-management procedures, and regulatory exposure.

The most important question for investors is whether the economics of the transaction remain defensible under the regulatory environment that may exist several years from now.

A business model that depends on regulatory tolerance for affiliate preference may warrant a lower valuation, stronger contractual protections, or a different transaction structure.

What Integrated Companies Should Do Now

Existing integrated companies should not assume that divestiture is inevitable.

They should assume that greater justification will be required.

Executive teams need a clear explanation of how the integrated structure benefits patients, customers, employers, and the healthcare system. That explanation should be supported by data and operating evidence rather than corporate messaging alone.

Companies should review whether affiliated and unaffiliated organizations receive comparable access and treatment. They should examine whether customers have meaningful choices, how reimbursement methodologies are established, and whether contracts could be viewed as coercive or exclusionary.

Boards should understand where earnings are generated across related entities. A business line that appears modest on a standalone basis may direct substantial volume or margin to another affiliate. Regulators may focus on that relationship even when each individual agreement appears commercially reasonable.

Governance practices should reflect this risk. Contracts and transactions among affiliates may require stronger documentation, independent review, conflict-management procedures, and clearer evidence of commercial reasonableness.

Companies that can establish a defensible record now will be in a stronger position when facing legislative scrutiny, contract renegotiation, litigation, or regulatory review.

The Executive Decision

The Tennessee FAIR Rx Act reflects a broader shift in how policymakers evaluate healthcare consolidation.

Attention is moving from the existence of common ownership to the ways integrated companies control patient flow, reimbursement, distribution, information, and market access.

Executive teams should map their ownership, referral, reimbursement, data, and contracting relationships. They should identify where one affiliate has the ability to influence business flowing to another and determine whether that relationship could be characterized as steering, self-preferencing, discriminatory treatment, or hidden compensation.

They should also be able to show measurable value for patients or customers and demonstrate that the business model would remain viable if affiliates and independent companies were required to compete on more equal terms.

Organizations that cannot support those conclusions may have a structural vulnerability.

Organizations that can may have a meaningful competitive advantage.

The Larger Business Lesson

Tennessee’s law may survive, be narrowed, or be struck down. Its importance does not depend entirely on the result of the current litigation.

The law reflects a broader change in the political and regulatory treatment of healthcare consolidation. Vertical integration is no longer automatically viewed as an efficient response to a fragmented system. It is increasingly evaluated through the conflicts, incentives, and commercial power that ownership may create.

That shift will affect acquisitions, joint ventures, management arrangements, preferred networks, affiliate contracts, and market-entry strategies across healthcare.

The companies that respond most effectively will examine their structures now, determine where regulation could change the economics of the business, and use that analysis to make better decisions about transactions, contracts, governance, and growth.

Lanton, Lanton & Sosa Law advises healthcare and regulated organizations on transactions, contracting structures, regulatory change, compliance, governance, and commercial strategy. In a market where ownership structures are becoming policy questions, legal analysis must extend beyond what is permitted today to how a business model may be evaluated tomorrow.